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:niTRO DUCT ION 
The general purpose of this study is to examine the experience 
of guilt as it has been describ.ed by contemporary psychologists and to 
dete~ine if some of their findings can be used by theologians to 
achie'Je a deeper understanding of the sacrament of Penance. In 
particular, the thesis will examine the im?lications of the ps,ychological 
experience of guilt for the r1~-1 rite of Penance. In this introduction, 
we will briefly touch on a few of the major points that will be developed 
in the paper. 
A. nu;'nber of differe:1t theorj.es concerning guilt are reflected 
i.n psychological literature. For exa.mple, Thoma.s Oden, in The Structure 
of Ar.;areness, describes authentic huma.·,.·d ty as Hfull a."ld open responsive-
ness to the moment, the readiness to receive and re-create what is given 
In sin, this mot;Jent is lost forever. Por Oden, sub-
jactive guilt is the awareness or memor,r of this lost moment. 
Oden draws upon Carl Rogers' theories of incongruence and 
.!tcceptance. It should be pointed out here, h011ever, ti:.a t the ps;ycholo-
' 
gist 1 s vi e>v of guilt differs from the theologian 1 s in a nurnber of im-
portcJ!lt W8:J'S. A theologian would say that subjective guilt is the 
a-vmrc:\<:>.ss of unforgiven sin and that the .stet-a of sin remains. "/!'hen 
·-------------------
1 
Thomas CdFJ?'!, Th0 Structure of .hraren-ass (Nashville: Abtngdon 
"'rt:H"C.': ~~·£~(';\ ··; 4"7 .~, ·.·.'"l .. .,J .,."'-""/' ..:. • t • 
1 
2 
a p~·son seeks out a priest of minister in order to confess his guilt, 
he is seeking the forgiveness of Christ. T'ne priest or minister, there-
fore, sees subjective guilt as the. person's a1-1areness that he is 
. .. . 
separated from Christ and now seeks to be reconciled with Him. Thus, 
~~ilt, in this perspective, is seen as a healt~ or good thing because 
it directs the person back to Christ. 
The perspective of a ps,ychologist or p~chiatrist is much 
' different. He mey be confronted with a person who is suffering from.~ a 
sense of guilt ( ofte!l based on a very real act) and who ha·s no hope or 
forgiveness. The person has been unable to find any sense of recon-
ciliation within his o·.n circle of frie:sds and family. In Rogerian 
p~Jchotherapy, the tharapist offers the client the one ~~ing that Will 
free hL'1'1 from his destructive sense of guilt and ~11~ him to grow. 
7hat one th.i.ng is total acceptance. 
The experience of Christ '-s accepta."lce is often very sudden. A 
person cannot hold his m·m guilt and receive Christ's acceptance 
. . ,t ly SlmU.J.. a...'leOUS • As he experiences Christ's acceptance, he must come to 
;:,ccept himself. In theological terms, guilt can be seen as an awareness 
of separation from Christ and a call to new grovnh in Him. 
The experience of acceptance in a psychotherapeutic situation 
:s r1::ch different.· The proces~ of kno~1ing and experiencing acceptance 
i::: gradual and often verJ painful. A person is likely to hold on to 
his sense of guilt even as he comes to know the therapist's acc~ptance. 
The therapist sees th9 ,atient's pers~stence in guilt (whether or not 
3 
the patient's sense of guilt is in pr.oportion to the act) as a refusal 
to grow. 
The difference between the two situations lies in the reality of 
faith and Christ Himself. A person who believes in Christ separates him-
self from Christ by sin. He experiences guilt as an awareness of his 
separation from Christ and a call to return to Him. Psychology does 
not and cannot presuppose faith. In human terms, a person does something 
that he perceives as being incongruent with his own self-image •. He can-
not incorporate this act as part of his own personality ( 11 ! couldn't 
have done. it. It's not me." or 11 ! can't help myself. I keep doing it."). 
The ps,ychologist attempts to show the patient that he is unconditional~ 
ac~eptable and helps him grow to-:<ard a more realistic self-image.· To the 
extent that the patient persists in his sense of guilt and refuses the 
psychologist's acce?tance, he is refusing to grow. 
~fuat theoloeians find of particular interest in this, howe:ver, is 
:1ot a definition of guil.t, but the means used to alleviate gUilt. Two 
dintinct schools of thought regarding guilt are represented by Hobart 
Mowrer and carl Rogers. l1owrer' s theory states that a sense of guilt is 
&.lle·.riated when one confesses his sin. (A ?sychotic patient, quoted by 
!1o-..rrer to support his argurnent, calls tJlis th·~ r:Dick Tracy theory of 
2 
th<H'apy. rr ) Roeer!1_, on the other hand, suggests that the therapist 
·;:oc:<Y.i.de the patient with a sense of betng '.mconditionally accepted. As 
, 
'· 
Ibid., p. 102. 
4 
the patient discovers that he is accepted despite both the action ~~d 
the feelings that motivated the action, he can let go of his guilt. Thus, 
for Mot-n-er, the patie.'lt alleviates his own guilt by confessj.ng his 
actions. For Rogers, guilt is alleviated by the experience of being 
3 
accepted by another. 
The significance of Rogers' understanding of acceptance becomes 
apparent when one views the change in emphasis from the old rite of 
Confession to the new rtte. As will be discussed in the following 
pages, the emphasis h<:'.s moved from confes.sion and judgment to acceptance, 
forgiveness, and reconciliation. 
This has been a brief introduction to a few of the ideas which 
will be discussed in the course of this study. Po?e Paul VI, in his 
address on the significance of the Pastoral Norms on Penance (Paoal 
Audience, Castel Gandolfo, July 19, 1972) referred to his fellow priests 
as ndoctors of souls ••• 'psychiatrists' of grace." Perhaps the science 
of psycholo~~, concerned with the healing process of the rrdnd, will be 
able to enhance our understanding of the healing power of grace in Con-
.fession. 
Ibid., p. 102. 
Part Ia THE PSYCHOLCG~CAL EXPERIENCE OF GUILT 
CHAP~ I 
TRUE GUIT.T - A !·!A':'TER OF DECISION 
A question of Nature 
In this section several theories of guilt will be examined (in-
eluding those of Freud, Boisen, Mowrer, and Rogers) in relation to the 
ps,ychologists 1 over-all vision of Man. Obviously, none of these theories 
will be dealt with in detail. ·Rather, these brief sketches are designed 
to highlight seteral of the Major schools of thought concerning the 
ps,ycholdgical experience of guilt. 
At least in theory, Freud did not recognize the existence oi 
1 . 
authentic guilt as it was defined in the Introduction. Freud saw man as 
biologically determined and the purpose of :man's life and "simply the 
1 . 
programme of the pleasure principle. rr Fear of authority figures re-
sulted in internalized rules and reg:rlations uhich became the superego. 
In boys, this fear of authority figures could be traced to fear of 
castration by the father. Girls remained something of a ~stery to Freud, 
and he never succeeded in pin-pointing the source of superego development 
in them. The suparego (or when it operated on a conscious level, con-
science) frustrated ~~·s desire for pleasure and was, therefore, the 
2 
:::o u·ce of man 1 s misery. 
• 
1 
Sigmund Freud, Civ·ilization and Its Discontents (New York: 
l·r.:.:"t·:m, 1962, originally published in Ge:111aey, '~930), p. 23. 
2 
1bid.' p. 33. 
6 
The superego forced the person to repress his natural drives 
and the frustration of these natu~a:-1 drives resulted in gut1t-£eelin;s. 
These feelings of guilt lay "• •• not in aeything wrong or 1 sintul 1 which 
the individual has done but in things he mere~ wants to do but cannot 
-3 
because of repression." Authentic ~lt played no part in a world 
determined qy biological drives. 
Religion was, in Freud's theor.y, one of the major forces that 
kept man enslaved to the forces of the superego. Martin Buher ·dismisses 
Freud's contentions as a last gasp (hopefully, a dying gasp).of the 
4 
Enlightenment attack against religion. David Bakan 6omea up with the 
extremely subtle, and what perhaps could kindly be called imaginative, 
t.heor.y that Freud was acting out a reverse Messianic complex. Freud 
saw his people, the European Jews, as victims of their own law, 
harrassed and persecuted because of a law that made them different, and, 
therefore, vulnerable. In Mases and Mon.otheism Freud argues that Moses 
was a Gentile and thus the Jews were not responsible for the. institution 
of the law. lh attacking the superego or conscience, Freud becomes the 
ne~1 J.Ioses, the one who liberates his people from the source of their 
5 
misery. 
3c. Allison, Guilt, Anger & God (New York: Seabury, 1972), p. 23. 
4 
Hartin Duber, "Gullt .rmd Guilt Feelings," Cross Currents (~958): 
or:' 
.... :;; . 
"" ::>
David Bakan, Si 1'~~!1•:!. Fre11d and the Jewish ]' :3tic!U Tradi tio'1. 
~~~~{,....,,tc·,., N J · 11an N·s1·"·"'d 19·o ·, ~, ........ -'-J.~'...,, "'' t •• V•·~ f.J ,._t... .. a , ;) • , 
. "' 
1 
Freud's motives aside, his theories were soon attacked by~ 
disillusioned disciples. In 19.36~ Anton B. Boisen published The Ex:olora-
tion gf tho Inner WOrld, and challenged the then current practice among 
psychiatrists of equating "normal" with the "average. 11 "The normal 
is what most people do, and any deviation from the normal they look upon 
with suspicion a..11d di sf.:tvor .•• To be good is unusual and therefore ab-
6 
normal." 
Boisen saw man as an essentially social being who is not con-
cerned with the aver.:1ge, but with the ideal. The determining principle 
of rna.11' s actions is not :r:leasure, rather 11 ••• of all human needs the deep-
est and most fundamental is that for response and approval by that social 
7 
something which is symbolized by the term God." Boisen did not en-
tirely reject Freud's theories on the impo~ance of childhood, but saw 
the formation of the moral person as ~eing a function of a need for 
acceptance within a group. (Boisen's strict social determinism is, 
however, mitigated by ·one other factor which will be described below.) 
Boisen maint,a~ns· .. that i-t is the social group that sets moral standards 
and a person tries. to live by those standards because of a need for 
approval .of the group .• 
The relationship to the group becomes all important, and a 
person judges himself by ethical standards which are deter-
::n:Lned b-.f the group with which he seeks identification and· 
6 
J~nton Boisen,. The Exploration of the Inner World (New York: 
p. i 64. 
7 
Ibid. J p. 170. 
8 
whose approval he needs. 8 
The pain of guilt is the p~in of isolation from the group. It 
is the violation of the group's ·standard and consequent isolation that· 
cause pain, therefore, for Boisen guilt becomes the source, not th~ 
symptom ot the person's problems. As guilt is fncurred by a· Violation 
of the group standards, one is dealing with authentic guilt, not guilt-
feelings, i.e., the repressed desire to violate a standard. 
-
Boisen maintains that this guilt could be resolved in one of · 
t.hree ways: (1) ·change actions, (2) change groups, or (3) withdraw from 
9 
the situation entirely and interpret reality to suit one's own needs. 
The result of the third alternative is mental illness. In this schema, 
a recognition of the action and·restoration of harmony with the group 
is sufficient to resolve guilt. Boisen does not see forgiveness and 
reconciliation as part of a possible resolution of guilt, and that is 
one of the central weaknesses of his theory • 
• 
B~isen's position was reiterated by Mowrer in 1960 in The Crisis 
in Pgrchiatrz and Reli~ion. Mowrer points out that if Freud's idea of 
guilt as a s,ymptdm were right, the person wh~ never experiences guilt 
' 
should be the healthiest, happiest person around. In reality, the per-
s'Jn who cannot experience guilt is usually diagnosed as psychopathic 
or sociopathic. This partic,ular personality .disorder is one of the most 
8 
Ibid., p. 172. 
9 
Ibid., p. 179. 
9 
difficult to cure. On the other hand, the person who can admit to 
a sense of guilt is more often on the road to recover,r. To treat guilt 
as a ·sickness, according to Mowrer, is to iinore the fact that the guilt 
may have a basis in reality. To recognize guilt as at least in some way 
authentic is to offer the hope of forgiveness and.reconciliation. Mowrer 
says that the probletll of mental illness is not one of illness but of sin. 
"Sickness," as we sl1all see increasingly in later chapters, · 
is a concept which generates pervasive pessimism and confUsion 
in the dol1lain of. psychopat.ltologyj wher,eas, sin for all its 
harshness, carries an i.."'!lplication of promise and hopes, a vision 
of new pQten1;.ialitie~. Ju.st so long as we deny the reality of 
sin, we cut ol.u-selv.3s off, it seems, from the possibility of 
radical redempticn ( "reco•;sry"). 10 
Mowrer, like Boisen, s~es man as a social being, responsive and 
. ,_ 
responsible. He sympathizes with Boisen's postti'on oh 'guilt but mourns 
the fact that .th~ :P;otest.ant past6r8.1 couns-eling movement, started in 
large part by Boisen, has tended to substitute insight for forgiveness. 
" 
Han's need for truth demands insight, but his social nature requires 
forgiveness. 
Therefore, in light of thetotal situation, I see no alternative 
but to turn again to the old, painful, but also promising 
possibility that man is preeminently a social creature and that 
he lives or dies, ps,ychologically and personally, as a function 
of the openness, community, relatedness, and integrity which by 
good action he attains and by evil action he destroys. 11· 
10 
0. Hobart Mqw-rer, The Crisis .in Pszchiat:rz and Religion 
(Princeton: Van Nostrand, i9b1), p. 4o. 
11 
Ibid.' p. 44. 
10 
~ ps.ychologists and theologians have praised Mowrer for his 
insistence on moral responsibil:,i ty, however, there are also a number . 
. . 
of weaknesses in his arg\Uilents. Mowrer insists that all guilt is 
authentic guilt and fails to make ~ distinction between authentic 
guilt and false guilt. Later in this stucy, it will be argued that 
false guilt ·mq often serve as a mask or facade for tru;e guilt, however, 
this d~s not mean that false guilt does not exist. False guilt must 
be dealt with in an explicitly psy-chological context in order to approach 
' 
and confront the .authentic guilt underlying it. 
Mowrer also maintains that the only wq to deal effectively' with 
guilt is to confess it to a "Significant Other." A therapist or a priest, 
according to Mowrer, :ts not a "Significant Other" and confession to one 
of them, while perhaps enhancing that particular relationship, will do 
nothing to change the person's over-all sense of guilt. The Significant 
Other must be someone present and important in one's social life so that 
confession will entail both an acknowledgment or evil action· and a loss 
of anonymity. 
Mowrer ignores both the meaning of sacr~~ental encounter in Con-
fession and the theological presuppositions of the therapeutic relation-
ship. As Filella points out, the Significant Other for 'the Christian is 
12 
C!1rist. The sacrament of Confession is an encounter with Christ and 




the priest who, b.1 virtue of his priesthood, is tl1e representative of 
Christ and the community of Chris~, that is the Church. The social na- , 
ture of confession and the consequent loss of the anonymity and deceit 
of ain, is brought about by virtue or the priest's representation or 
Christ and the Church. Because of the lllter-relation (and one could say 
inter-dependence) of each person within the MYstical Bo~, confessi~.c~ 
never by an isolated act. "In the Christian Community there is no ~ch 
thing as a complete~ secret confession: .~11 confessions are open in·the 
. 13 
deepest sense of the ·:rcrd. rr 
The therapist 1 s acceptance in th·:= therapeutic model is seen as repre-
sentative acceptance. The therapist may represent a significant person 
in the client's life or society itself. In the case of false guilt, the 
therapist. accepts feelings the client can.'lot accept himself. He can do 
this, according to nrmtning, be~ause all feeli~~s (as distinguisAed from 
behavior) have been and are being accepted by God at every .. moment .. this 
theory "Till be discussed in much greater detail in Chap:ter Four. In the 
case of authentic guilt, the clien't.~y also see t.ne tnerapis,.'s for .. 
giveness as representative forgiveness ~sofar as the therapist represents 
society for him.· 
M~drer argues that ethics, for the most part, are identical with 
tt"1e f!,rvup standard and are taught :·md should be taught to the child 
----·-------
13 
Thid., p. 200. 
12 
through a process called 11defensive identification. 11 "Defensive identi-
fication is, in· essence, what the Rogerians would call introjection; it 
. . . . 
,. is a process whereby the child takes over the moral values of his parents 
1h 
as a wey of defending himself from rejection, insecurity, disapproval." 
J1owrer's idea of morality thus becanes a matter of ccnditioning 
rather than choice. Moreover, Brmming argues that since this condition-
ing makes culture and society the criteria of moral standards, rather 
15 . 
than God, it is essentially a form of idolatry. Although l'bwrer 
initially appears to be an advocate of free choice and moral responsibility 
his idea of the moral formation of man is almost as deterministic as 
Freud's. Mowrer sees man as a socially determined being while Freud sees 
man as a biologic~ determined being. 
Carl Rogers moves from an idea of man as a socially determihed 
being to one whose primary drive is for growth itself. In Client-
centered 'lllerau, Roge!"S states that "the organiSin has one basic tendency 
and striving .. to actualize, maintain, and enhance the experiencing 
16 
organism. 11 Browning, in explaining this concept states: 
This basic drive, or actualization tenden~, is seen as a 
forward-moving force that propels the individual toward ever-
increasing auton~ and socialization. In short, the actuali-
. . ~
14 
Don S. Br<>'.ming, Atonement and Psychotherapy (Philadelphia: 
Hestmir.i.ster Press., 1.966), p. 190. 
iS 
Ibid.·,; p. 191 • 
Carl Rogers, Client-centered TherapY (New York: Houghton 
Ki~flin, 1951), P• 487. 
13 
zation tendency can be seen as the striving of the organism toward 
ever-expanding areas of socialized autongmy •••• It should be pointed 
out that this basic actualization tendency refers to the organism 
as a whole, is not limited to one specific organ or tissue need, 
includes segmental or deficienc,y needs, but also transcends them. 17 
In simple terms, Rogers 1 actualizaticn tendency may be th~t 
of as a need to grow. Wnether man is propelled or drawn to change is, 
of course, open to debate {Rogers would s~ propelled), but growth it-
self remains intrinsic to the understanding o:t man. 
In Browning 1 s analysis of Rogers., two m~or .concepts are in- . 
volvedvdth 'actualization: "the organismic valuing I?rocess" and "Con-
gruence." · The organi~ic valuj,nlit process, according to Browning, can 
18 
be translated as "experiencing" and "feeling." What this means is 
.. 
that people tend to choose that which will enhance. their. own beiJlg, that 
which will "actualize" them. They make a decision based on the data 
available to them at that manent. However, as dif.ferent people ,_see 
different things as good at <different times, this valuing is a PJ"OCess, 
not a fixed-system. Rogers says tb.at this .abilicy-: to decide is an 
organic .function .• 
.A ahlld ·is free to choose ·and does so naturally, unles$ his 
choices are interfered with by an adult. 'w'lhen confronted with a choice 
of doing what he wants or doing l-rhat the adult wants him to do.a the 
17 
BroV;ning, p. 97. 
18 
Ibid., p. 101. 
child will do what the adult wants him to do in order to keep the love 
of the adult.· For. instance, a cltild may have ~been. t~ught that anger 
is ~rong; therefore, in order to protect his self-image of being a 
good, ~~ lovable, person, he will refuse to admit feelings ot anger 
into his self-awareness. Rogers calls this inability "incongruence." 
A person is incongruent if he denies or distorts organismic feelings 
19 
in an attempt to protect his self-image. 
A third concept necessazy to understand Roger's thought ·is "the 
need for positive regard.". The need for positive regard involves the 
social prerequisites that ara necessary if a person .is to 8l"'W, feel, 
and perceive the world "extensionally" or in ~erma or reali'ti". Un-
conditional positive regard, or acceptance, in this sense, does not 
connote approval. Judgment is suspended. 
A client is received ps,ychologically if he senses that all that 
he is, •tear, despair, insecurity, or anger,' is being admitted 
into the experiencing ot the therapist. A person is receiving 
unconditional .positive regard when he is beiri.g received; into the 
organismic experiencing of the therapist without being misper-
ceived by the secondary distorting and denying operations of" 
the cmditions of worth. 20 
Because the need for positive regard is a prerequisite for 
change, it becamss essential for ~ successful kind of ps.ychotherap,y. 
n1 fact, it has been speculated that the particular technique utilized 
in psychotherapy is actually less i.1'!lportant than the relationship that 
19 
Carl T. Rogers and Barry Stevens, Person to Person (New York: 
Pocket Book: 1967), p. 9. 
20 
Browning, p. 113. 
·, :;.. 
1S 
exists between the therapist and the client. It is the relationsnip 
that makes growth and change possible. 
- . . 
Roge:rs 1 goal in psychotherapy is to free the person from false 
standards o;t worth by offering him unconditional acceptance within the 
therapeutic relationship (or acceptance that is an unconditional as the 
therapist is capable of offering). As the client gradually accepts the 
therapist's acceptance, he is able to admit former~ forbidden thoUghts 
and feelings into his consciousness and is free to make self-actualizing 
choices. · 
To summarize, psychological thought has moved from an idea of 
ma~ as a biologically determined being (Freud), to a soci~ deter-
Mined being (:Boisen and Mowrer), to a. being that is characterized by 
a nee~ to grow as an individual and in relation to others (Rogers). 
However, Rogers leaves two inportant questions open: what is the source 
of man's need to grow and what is the goal ot his grbWth? R<>gers sqs 
that· the need to grow stems from an actualization· tendency and the goal 
of actualization is socialized autonOllzy'. In both cases, he is detining 
the ~ource and the goal by the:-process. lii later chapters of this stud;y 
1·1e will suggest that these two questions springing from a psychological 
thao:ry may require theological a.."'lswers. 
A Question of Conscience 
1h ps,ychoan~tic literatu!e, the conscience was considered to 
be the conscious part of the superego. Since guilt was considered to 
be a s,ymptam, the ~ to free a person from the pain of guilt-feelings 
~:as to go after the source. "Twenty-five years ago, in the heydey of 
Freudianism, most psychologists, if they were interested in the phenom.en-
on of conscience at all, were concerned only to the extent of discovering 
21 
how to get .rid of it. " 
As was mentioned earlier, the superego was seen by Freud as being 
a. set of standards internalized out of a sense of fear. However, there 
is another aspect to the superego, the ego-ideal. 
Liilked to the same idealization of parental power that led to 
identification with perceived value s.ystems of the punishing 
parents is still another aspect of the superego. 'lhe ego-
ideal, as it is called, is t.he love side rather than the hate 
side, of ear~ relationships with the parents ••• 22 
Ih a heal~, mature person the"standard set b,y the ego-ideal is 
positive and .. realistic reSI,ll ting ~ congr'..letlce. But the. ego-ideal can 
set a standard th~t is unattainable and unrealistic and,. when a person 
continual]¥ fails to live up to this standard, the result can be d~ 
21 
l1o..,:rer, "1eaming Behavior and Behavior Therapy," Handbook of 
Clinic;al Psychology (N3rTYork: }!cGrat-t, 1965), p. 244. 
22 
Tiobert J. Campbell, rrsuperego anj Conscience," in Conscience: 
Its Fr,;edom and Limitations, ed. William C. Bier, S.J. (New York: Fordham, 




pression and loss of self-esteem. The ego uses various strategies to 
protect itself from the guilt-producing feelings provoked by the 
super•ego. At the extremes, these~ strateg-ies can appear as sociopat."'lic 
behavior or scrupulosi t:.r. 
Boisen sat-1 conscience as a set of standards internalized out of 
a need to be accepted by a group. Hoffman agrees that conscience. is 
formed out of the experience o! relationship. Fear and genuine guilt 
"•• .should not be viewed as ::;enarate realities, but rather as positiQns 
. .: .. ..., '. . . . . ... :. ~23 . . . . 
along a spectru.."'Tl of relationships ••• 11 
l. 
The recognition of the gen';sis of fear and' its relation to guilt,· 
however, points to a reali t:y which is extremely important, namely, 
to the fact that love is the fou."ldation ot all mora1i ty; that a 
truly moral conscience cannot arise without the experience of a 
loving relationship even if it be an ambivalent one. 24 
Although Boisen sees m~L 1 S conscience as being largely deterodned 
by rela.tionship,·pe 'rejects the idea of conscience as a static set of 
values. The standards change as the· relational gr011ps change, even 
though the influence of the primary relational group (the parents) re-
mains strong. T11e :i.nnuence· of the relational group is mitigated by 
the influence or 'an ideal (or, perhaps, idealized) group - a: kind ot 
social equivalent .. of the ego-ideal. 
But t~ ethical id~als and standards whi~h are thus impla"lted 
2.3 
Hof.fm .• m, nGuilt, Aspiration and the Free Self, 11 Humani tas 5 
(F~ll, 1969): p. 1)2. 
24 
Ibid.' ·p. 132. 
. .. 
18 
b.1 parents and childhood experiences are not fixed and rigid 
except in pathological cases. Conscience is not just backward-
looking. It lies rather ••• on the growing edge of hll!Tlml nature •••• 
And the ideals or standards bjr which we judge ourselves are 
determined not so nmch by the groups to which we have belonged 
as by that to which we aspire, not so much by the yesterdays 
as by the tomorrows. 25 
The psychological theories of Freud, Boisen, and others, tend 
toward an emotive concept of conscience, i.e., a definition of con.-
. - ~ 
science as n~ •• a distinctive sentiment or mode of feeling." Philoso-
phy and theology have tended to see conscience ~n cognitive terms. Sin 
is a decision and, -t.herefore, is controlled by the will_. The wiU is 
influenced by both the emotions and the intellect. Since conscience re-
sides in the intellect, it is the intellect that must override the 
emotions and dominate the will if the person is to avoid si;n. The .f'ollow-
ing quo~tion glves an example of this defini tiori of. ccnscience: . 
In the final analysis this is just what sin is: will and emotiOn 
rebelling agtrl,nst the influence of God in the mind •••• Shallow 
thinking is tlie ·worst enemy of the (hristian desirl~ God 1 s will 
in his life, beca11se thi$ is powerless to ma:intain the mind's 
necessary dominanoe over will and snotions. 2? 
The danger arises, according to McNeil, when man·seeks to 
objectify a 51stem of ethics. The result becomes a rigid structure .of 
25 
Boisen, p. 176. 
26 
John A .Dine.en, S.J., 11Freedom of Conscience in a Philosophical 
Pez-s::,e~tive, 11 in Conscience: Its Freedom a11d Limitations, p. 102. 
27 
o. Quentin Hyder, M.D., The Christian's Handbook of Psychiatzz 
( Cld Tapp.m,~ N.J.: Ravell, 1971), p. 43. 
laws necessitating a judicial approach to the interpretation of moral 
situations. 
d 
. All objectivized systems, especially the traditional idea of an 
ethics based on natural law, depend on the presupposition that 
man possesses a static, unchanging substantial nature. as souree 
of his actions. Such an idea has the advantage of rendering 
possible a moral philosophy of necessary, universal; and abso-
lute principles. However, an overemphasis on these qualities 
of an objective system can lead, and has led to a systematic 
misunderstanding of the existent person as such, and tends to 
deliver Ill8n !rom the ult:im.ate risk of his freedom, which is-
his grande~. 28 
19 
McNeil belieVes that the concept of conscience, to be understood 
accurately, requires a dynamic view of :man. His idea of man is very 
much like that of Carl Rogers' - ma..?'l is characterized by growth in re-
lation to other men. Ha.."l 1 s goal in this sense is to become h:im.self and 
the criterion for judgment, therefore, is his own authenticity. 
To be true mea.?'ls to become that "'t'lhic..li. one really is. It 
represents a s.earch for all the necessary conditions of ,interior 
self-adequation, a search from within self-consciousness for 
the me~ing and direction or man's freely willed activity •••• 
Conscience within this perspective is a developing form of self-
awareness¥ it i·s to be u.."lderstood as tl;le deepest self-cmsciou.sness 
of man insofar as it acts as a pmver of discrimination, deciding 
in every ch-oice what will promote authentic sel.fhood and what Will 
stand in its way. Nan on the noral level is characterized by 
self•development. He perceives ever,r choice as a cha.ice between 
authentic or inauthentic humanity. 29 
28 
John J. Mclieil, S.J., "Freedom of Conscience in Theological 
Pel~s_?ective1 " in Conscience: Its Freedom cmd Limitations, p. 112. 
29 ' . 
Ibid., pp 113 and 120. 
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The existence of a "good" conscience in a person is dependent 
on a clear vision of self. Man has the power to "look within himsel£ 
':. 30 
·and decide ·what kind of sel£ he .will be. n This ability entails 
congruence, openness, trust. It presupposes an essential freedom -
one is able to act in a way that promotes self-fulfillmEilt, one is not 
destined to react in ~ predetermined manner. 
The k~ presupposition ••• is an attitude of openness, ot trust 
in life. One acts to achieve self-fulfillment; one must bel~ve. 
that by means of commitment one can achieve that self-fulfillment • 
• • • }Ioral evil represents the refusal to be onesel£; moral goOd, 
a sincere seeking of self-t"ulfillment. 31 
Again, the prerequisite for actualization is socializ~tion. In 
order to have developed a sense of selfhood, the self-awareness that 
McNeil terms conscience, one must have experienced positive relationships. 
Conscience, interpreted as self-awareness, cannot be seen in isola~ion. 
A person is able to decide only in relation to others. McNeil concludes 
that conscience (self-awareness) " ••• is transposed into love itself." 
Guilt, which was defined as the refusal to grOT...r, becomes "the refusal 
32 
to be for others." Conscience, formed in relationship, moves in-
exorably tram love to love. "Ideal spiritual adulthood for the conscience 
"1-iCuld consist ln this: that the compass of love would point the direction 
33 
so unfalteringly that 'the external law is no longer needed.u 
30 
C. Fitzsimmons Allison, Guil-t, .An;er & God (New York: Seabury 
Press, 1972}, p. 23. 
Ji 
McNeil, p. 116. 
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Ibid.' p. 121. 
A Question of Acceptance 
Guilt, which for Freud was~a s,ymptom, became the source of social 
disharmony in Boisen's theories. Hith Rogers' theories of actualization 
and socialization, the distinction between true and false guilt becomes 
more apparen~. To p~sist in a sense qf ~~lt is to refuse to grow. 
'When one experiences a sense of guilt, one is aware that he .has done 
something that .. is not in harmony with his 01-m self-image. As a person 
becomes aware of the aot whic~ P.recipitated t.hts s.ense o.t guilt, he be-
cernes aware, of a contradiqtion in his arm personalicy. This painful 
contradiction has been described~ Paul in Romans 7:14-20. In order 
to overcame this contradiction, one must grow into a more realistic 
unde:-standing of self. 
However, as Rogers points out, the prerequisite for actualization 
is acceptance. A person defines himself in relation to others. One can-
not accept himself if he has not first been accepted by others. This 
acceptance (or positive regard) must be founded in truth if it is to be 
real acceptance. Tl:e process of rationalization intrinsic to sin de-
strO".rs the fabric of truth that makes relationship possibl~. Sinmltane- / 
ously, rationalization destroys the truth that makes self-acceptance 
possible. The pain of guilt is the pain of a person who can no longer 
accept the reali t;y of who he is. 
If true guilt is the betr3.Yal of t~e truth of what one is, false 
gui:t denies that the truth exists. False guilt involves identi~ and 
pres:.nes that acceptance has never been experienced (or that t.'le ex-.: 
21 
22 
perience has been distorted or was inadequate.) The person with a false 
sense of guilt is not concerned -vg.th a bad deed, but with a sense of 
being a bad person. 
Guilt is never entirely true as no decision is ever entirely 
free. However, neither is guilt ever entirely false. Even in the 
pS,Ychotic there remains a 'core' that is not determined by a false self-
image or perception of reality. If this were not so, there would be no 
hope of recovery for the person. Congruence and incongruence ~xist 
side by side in ·each person, and any attempt to resolve guilt mu-st deal 
·.-dth both aspects. 
CHAPTER II 
FALSE GUTI.T - A !1ATTER OF IDENTITY 
Conditiofial Badness 
The difference between conditonal badness and neurotic guilt 
is one of degree rather than kind. Both involve a sense of identit,y. 
Conditional b~dne13§ is experienced '.:hen_ one. feels himself to be an 
acceptable, lovable person only after he has won the approval of 
' ' ' 
another. Approval is won through 'right' actions, and, therefore, 
moral! ty becomes the price one p.:zys to maintain a sense. of worth. 
This approval should not be confused 'With the acceptance dis-
cussed in the previous chapter. Acceptance is the positive regard 
or prizing of the whole person. Approval involves a ju~ent forcing 
morality to become the palm in an elaborate game, the object of which 
is to maintain a sense of worth which insures survival. France terms 
this kind of rnorali ty rr cheap morality, rr as opposed to costly or genuine 
morality which del'llands growth. ''A genuine moral concern demands. that I 
lJ~re my enemy; a cheap morality demands that I PW attention to the 
1 
opinions of my friends instead. 1t 
i.. ' ,. 1 .··, 
There is, perhaps, a little of this kind of guilt in ever,rone, 
1 
Halcolm France, The P·'Iradox of Guilt: a Olristian 
.?;elJ . .ef of Self-Hatred (Philadelphia: United urch Press, 
2.3 
' f 
a feeling that someone is keeping score. Condi.ticnal badness is a 
childish approach to moralit,y marked by a lack of a sense or worth~ 
or a developed sense of identity. The immature person tends to be more 
concerned with the possibility of punishment than with the motives under-
~ing his actions. A child, for instance, has little sense of the 
mdaning of accident. Breaking a cup by accident is as immoral as punch-
ing a plqmate in the stomach - and more so if the mother discovers the 
shattered cup but misses the violence wrought on the playground. Toumier 
points out that someihing of this association of guilt with accident re-
. 2 
mains in each adult, "a kind of latent, unconscious, yet tearful guilt." 
The person who is trying to win acceptance by being good is~ of 
CO'.lrse, doomed to disappointment. One can no more.- earn acceptance than 
one can earn heaven. Conditional badness can be thought or as a kind or 
P~J'cholcgical Pelagianism. The person acting out or a sense of condition-
al ba~~ess is actual~ searching for unconditional love, but his actions 
necessarily put conditions on that love and, therefore, whatever. he re-
ceives in terms of love and acceptance will be inadequate. He places 
conditions on the acceptance he seeks from others because he feels. that 
he is essentially a bad person and not worth l·oving. "As an adult he 
vlill always be looking for approval from his friends, but he cannot 
~dn it from himself. His position is ver'!J paradoxical; he is inviting 
2 
p. 42. Paul Tournier, Guilt an:i Grace (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 
. + 
3 
others to love what he secretly cc>nnot love." 
Eventually, the experience of acceptance can make the need for 
approval less urgent, but, to the degree .that acceptance has not been 
experienced, childish needs can became adult neuroses. 
3 




To persist in a __ sense of guilt is to refuse to g_row, to conscious• 
1y deny the truth of one's ~ being. When one experiences a sense of' 
false guilt, however, one acts because of a false self-image. The image 
is not the result of an act. A person who has experienced acceptance can 
grow in self-awareness and in a~areness of the needs of others. However, 
if because of childhood experiences, a person fails to grow into a 
realistic awareness of himself (Neurosis), the person may become convinced 
that he is an evil person and act accordingly'. In other. cases,_ :the per-
son may be con.,inced that if he doesn't follow certain .rigiq formulas, 
he will certainly became an evil person. This is false or neurotic guilt. 
Like true guilt, it is the result of a failure to perceive oneself realistic-
ally. However, in the case of neurotic guilt, this failure is conditioned 
rather ~~an the result of a deliberate decision. 
Until someone invents or manufactures perfect p~rents, there will 
be imperfect, painful childhood experiences. These e;x.periences, .repressed 
or etched in vivid memories, are like~ to form the basis for neurosis 
and incongruence. Everyone is a little neurotic and, to repeat what 
was stated in Chapter One, guilt always involves both decision and 
identity. 




often experienced as "an agonizing conviction that oneself is essential~ 
4 
bad." Because of .tlrls belief ~hat one is essential~ bad, one will 
act in a way that provokes punis.'1ment. T'.ne person experiencing a true 
sense of guilt suffers from it after the co~~ssion of an act. The 
person suffering from pervasi 78 g~1il t feels bad all of the time and Will 
act cut t.hese feelings in order to give his suffering a concrete cause 
and in order to incur punishment. "Pervasive guilt drives its victims 
to wrongdoing while normal guilt results from wrongdoing. " 
5 
The person feels g;1il ty beca'..lse he has been rejected and has 
interpreted that rejecticn as punis~~ent. According to SChneiders, the 
equation goes like this: 11 I am uorthless, bad, and evil (since I am 
6 
rejected); but only the guilty are bad and evil; therefore, I am guilty. n 
Isolation and guilt (true a~d false) are close~ related. In the 
case of t:rn..1e guilt, a person becomes isola. ted as a result of his actions. 
With false guilt, the isolation is a source of the feelings of guilt. 
never having been accepted, the person is unable to reach beyond his 
own pain to a.cce~t others. "Hany people feel their loneliness to be an 
4 
George A. Bensen, H. D. J T:-~.en Joy Breaks Through (New York: 




Ibid.:, p. 29. 
Ala."'(a.nder A. Schneiders, "The Nature and Origins of Guilt, 11 
Ihrr.:-<:1itas 5 (Fall, 1969): 180. 
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aecusation in itself; they think that others would have succeeded in 
retaining frlands where they have_ failed. To be isolated is to be 
7 
guilty alread;y' •••• " 
The mature (congruent) person can cope with both separation and 
involvement. He can make a distinction between solitude and isolation; 
he sees involvement as a means to self-discovery and not an escape. 
Jager sees neurosis in general, and neurotic guilt in particular~ 
as a means of coping with isolation. One tries to control isolation 
by being a bad person and thus "being the author of ••• isolation." "I 
will accuse nvself o£ eve:ry wrong-doing, of lack of will or of stupidicy 
in order to hide from ~self that ~ stagnation, ~ repetition of~-
self, :my despair, my emptiness is in the reality the absense of others." 
Two of the distin~~ishing characteristics of depression are a 
sense of isolation and a sense of helplessness. The person needs to be 
able to act for himself, but first he needs to be accepted (not directed) 
by others. Jager maintains that depressives use false guilt as a means 
to isolate themselves from others and avoid change. 
In the world of the depressive, guilt spins around its own axis 
because in tr~t world the ver,y possibility for change is missing. 
7 
France, p. 17. 
8 
Bernd Jager, "Dread and Guilt in Philosophy and Clinical 
Practice, 11 Hu..7!lanita.s S (Fnll, 1969): 167. 
8 
That fundamental possibility is another persan •••• The essential 
and primar,y fact of the world of the depressive is that it is 
closed off from others and that it has excluded others. 9 
.,,' : ' 
9 




Conscience in the scrupulou<:s person, rather. than be:i.ng a selt-
al.rctreness that invites growth and development, has become a rigid set 
of rules· that impede development. Scrupulosity is a "defect in person-
ality, and thus a defect in conscience. In the scrupulous person the 
10 
superego has become too rigid, literal and intlexible." The person 
becomes caught up·in a rigid set of rules and loses his capacity to 
reel or think free~. 
The scrupulous person and the sociopath (who will be discussed 
belm~) are polar opposites in many ways, although both are extreme 
eX<¥71ples of false guilt. The scrupulous person, uriiike the sociopath, 
often comes from a stable home with relative~ happ,y f~ai~ backgrdund. 
He is an obedient child and a model student who is vert eager to please 
and very dependent on others for approval. Rather than act out his 
anger or sexual feelings as the sociopath does, he will_ repress them.. 
'. 
''The scrupulous child tends to over-intellectualize, is over-controlled, 
11 
inhibited, and coristrictive." 
Weisner lays much of the blame for the development of scrupulosity 
in children on .the Catholic schools where children were taught sex is 
10 
i-layne A. Weisner, "Abnormalities in the Development of Conscience," 
in Ccm,;cience: Its Freedom and Limi tattons, p. 6). 
11 




bad before they knew what it was. Most children, when ccnfronted with 
sanething they don't understand, mll simply ignore it. Therefore., the 
. . .. . -
dire warnings of the evils of impurity 'in thought, word, and deed' 
£lew harmlessly over their heads. However, the scrupulous child., who 
is anxious, contused, and lacks natural spontaneity will take every 
word to heart and will develop elaborate mechanisms to combat. his grow-
ing sense o£ guilt. One solution may be to transfer all responsibili~ 
£or action to an authority figure, so that the burden o£ guilt and 
potential guilt is lifted. In adults this mechanism becanes the 
12 
11 external conscience. 11 
False guilt often serves as a mask or facade for the person's 
persistence in a sense of true guilt, which is the re.tu.sal to grow. 
vleisner has found t.hat in children and adolescents, scrupulosity masks 
an inability to accept sexual roles and independence. 
In adolescents, resolution of the probla~ of scrupulosity seems 
to go h~~d-in-hand with acceptance of and adjustment to new-
found femininity or masculinity. Toward the conclusion o£ treat-
ment, these children begin to behave more like typical teenagers. 
They begin to engage in normal social activities with the opposite 
sex •••• This might be another way of saying that they were helped 
to develop a sense of identity and independence. They became 
secure and mature enough ·to rea.ch a decision and act upon it. 1.3 
i2 
(J."n"' ~· -· ~ 
John J. Pot-rell, S.J., "Guilt," St. Anthony's Messanger 82 
1974): 37. 
13 
Weisner, p. 69. 
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Growth and development always happen in relation to others. The . 
r morality 1 that prevents the scrupulous person from developing al.so pre-
vents him from relating to others in any mea.nil}gful way.· 
I refer to people for whom the necessar.r ethical dimension of 
life, .without which we are not truly human, has sanehow become 
a burden which lessens their capacity to respond freely, loving:cy-
and creative~ to that ver,r humanness in themselves and others 
which the moral imperative is supposed to safeguard. So en-
cumbered are they with the necessity to be moral that they have 
lost the capacity to be loving. 14 
14 
Hoffman, p. 126. 
. "' 
Sociooathic Behavior 
On the opposite pole . frofu the scrupulous person is the psycho-
pathic or sociopathic personality. rn British p-sychology, the term 
is psychopath; in American psychology, the term is sociopath and is a 
type of" acting Oll.t neurotic. Although the terms may change., the 
pr6bleiil remains the sa'l'!l~. The sociopath is a person without conscience 
who, apparently, is incapable of experiencing guilt. 
In terms of chil~~ooj experience, there are a number of causes 
of sociopathic beh.'3.vior. Barring serious brain damage, the causes all 
revolve around a sense of being a bad person and a need to incur puniSh-
ment. Craft suggests that a false sense of guilt may be caused by 
severe rejection, u~~al~ involving one hostile parent and one dis-
interested par~nt. Another possibility may be a combination of mild 
15 
rejection and mild dar.t..'1ge to the brain area (probably the hypothalamus). 
It is also possible that the person may assume the guilt of his 
parents. He may have witnessed the evil his parents have done, perhaps . 
in tei'!lls of ·hostility toward each other or towards him, and the child 
wtll not be able to ace~pt the fact that these people, his parents, who 
are the center of his existence, could act in such a manner. Instead, 
he :Till prefer to believe that he is the source of evil, taking the 
15 
John Craft, ed., PSif:chopathic Disorders (New York: Pergammon, 
1966), p. 68. 
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3b 
guilt of his parents upon himself. 
The person suffering this~kind of false guilt will tend to 
act out in wqs that will force others to punish him. He creates crisis 
situations that provoke reactions of anger and rejection. "Unresolved 
guilt creates a need to make amends, to make restitution, to suffer 
enough to pay back what is amiss, to set things 'right' by damage to 
16 . 
self and thus balance the 'crime' • 11 As Menninger points out, sane 
of these actions are really "lifesavers. 11 Forcing others to i~ict 
punishment relieves the "guilty" person of the necessity of punishing 17 
himself. 
1"he sociopath may be hurt and/or angered by the response of 
others, but eventually he ~ divo:rce the response from the original 
act that provoked it. He will start to expect hostility and rejection, 
lies and betrey-al, as a matter of course. vJhile the fabric of a normal 
person's world is woven with truth and trust, the sociopath's world is 
a paranoiac tangle of suspicion and fear. 
Guilt tends to rob the self of aQy sense of well-being and does 
not allow us to enjoy fully our health, wealth, and well-being 
while we have them. It leads us to expect misfortune, the mal;. 
functioning of machines, hostility from people. And what we 
expect becomes a factor in evoking what we receive. 18 
i6 
Allison, p. 12. 
Karl Menninger, Whatever 13e-J<Jme of Sin? (New York: Hawthorn, ~,..,.,,, 88 
'71-;'JJ p. • 
18 
Allison, p. 12. 
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Another characteristic of the sociopath is that he acts out of 
impulse. His actions are never pyemeditated, but rati1er are in response 
to the pressures and needs of the mcrnent. Dorothea McCarthy, in her 
article on formation of conscience, mentions the relationship betli"een 
the abilit.y to defer immediate rewards and trust. 
The 't-rell-cared for infant learns very early that 't-Then his mother 
is there, making certain sounds in getting his bottle ready, he 
will be fed, and that everJthing will be all right. The child 
thus learns to wait and trust his mother, and in so doing he 
also learns to deter i~~ediate gratification of his desires. 19. 
The sociopath has neYer learned to wait or to trust others. He 
recognizes standards of right and wrong but only in terms of possible 
puniShment. Predictably, his relationships are shallow and exploitativ~. 
He k-nct.,rs the difference beti-reen right and wrong. Any anxiet.y or 
depression that he might feel is the result of having been caught 
or exposed, or the fear of it, not the result of the actio~ itself 
•••• He rarely loves deeply and almost never allows himself to be-
came involved in a meaningful love realtionship with anyone. 20 
' t 
19 
Dorothea HcCarthy, "Development of the Normal Conscience," 
in Consciencs: It's Freedom a"1d Limitations, p. 45. 
20 
Hyder, p. 87. 
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_The Relationship of True Guilt to False Gtdl t 
Returning to Rogers, man is a being who needs to grow and needs 
to be accepted ( socialized autonomy). A persistent sense of guilt 
can be a conscious refusal to gror1. The person with a false sense of 
guilt has also stopped growing and is using guilt itself as a means to 
avoid the necessity of grO'W7Jl. The scrupulous person sees guilt lurking 
around ever,y corner,; the sociopath is unaware that guilt exists except 
in punish.'"llent. Both are -oblivious to the people around them. 
The inability to love is the key to the problem of false guilt. 
The person who is suffering from trtle guilt may refuse. to love, but 
the person who is suffering from a false sense or guilt cannot love. In 
the process of growing to p~Jchological matur1 ty, the persatlearns to 
tra.'lscend himself, to love unselfishly. He can do this irisofar as he 
has acquired a realistic image of himself as a loving and loved creature. 
But the person'' Who is experiencing raise guilt has stopped growing - he 
is fixated at an earlier stage. AlthoUgh his words mey indicate the 
opposite, he ·Will. feel that he is essentially· evil and the only kind of 
love or nurturing he should or can have is punishment. · Ver,y often the 
person with a false sense oj guilt will use it as a mask to avoid con-
fronting tr~e guilt. 
Thus a 'false guilt' seems likely to blanket a 'true guilt' and 
to drmv its implacable venom therefrom ••• this true guilt con-
s~sted in a certain refusal to develop, to assu."lle fall selfhood 
or total responsibility in a given situation. 21 
21 
Tournier, p. 65. J6 
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One illustration of ~ha qyna~cs of the true-false guilt re-
lationship is the student who is making very bad grades or is flunking 
-. 
out ·of school. Alli$on says if you· show him a student who is flunking 
out, he'll show you a student w:it.b a false";sense 9f,guilt - probably 
towards his_parents. 
A college chaplain, who is an old acquaintance, insists that he 
has known no stud~nt to fail merely for academic reasons. "They 
all had an emotional need to fail. They flunk out because. of · 
some deep and usually unconscious need to fail." Incident~, . 
this phenomena is quite often related to the sense of guilt which 
the student has about his relationship with hies parents. 22 
Or. the surface, it app-;ars that the student is experiencing a 
false or neurotic sense of t;:.ti.lt. He has an idea that he is evil and 
needs to be p~~ished. Therefore, he fl~~s out of school forcing his 
parents to punish hi.-n. However, on a deeper level, the student is also 
masking a true sense of ~uilt resulting from his refusal to g~i. 
People grow to maturit'J as naturally as a plant grows towards sunshine. 
If a person refuses to take the next step to maturity, be will pay a 
high price ·ror his denial of self. The student might pre.fer the wrath 
of an angry parent to the discove:rJ that he is capable of being a 
successful, lovable person apart from his parents. 
Excessive driru{ing (including alcoholism), drug abuse, sexual 
promiscuity, shoplifting and: other forms of theft (the "rip-off'i), all 
e:T these can be forms of false guilt into which a person escapes to 
av-o.id ·the necessity of real gro·..;th. 
22 
A.llison, p. 12. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL RESOLUTia~ OF GUILT 
What It Means to Say "I'm Sorry" 
Guilt that is unrecognized or ignored is essentially self-
destructive. Living things are rarely stagnant; they are either growing 
or eying. To persist in a sense of guilt in the face of acceptance is· 
essentially self-destructive. Therefore, it is necessar.Y for a therapist 
to deal with the problem of guilt, not out of a desire to impos~ a 
particular ethical standard, but because guilt, as a self-destructive 
force, is opposed to the principle of life and the healing process. 
It is not for the analyst to}lecide what is sinful for his . 
patient or what he should do about it. The psychoanaqst be-
lieves that the qualities of aggression and self-destruction 
are evil, and this he can point out wit.'lout charging the patient 
with moral turpitude, or camnitting him to a ~ecific obligation, 
or himsel.f (the analyst) to an esoteric or specific code •. Why are 
aggression and self-destruction prL~a facie evils for.the ps,ycho-
ana~st to single out? Because both are opposed to the life 
principle, to· the healing of the patient's disorganization .and 
distress. 1 
Menl'linger picks up, many of Mawrer' s ·ideas regarding guilt a.e a 
self-destructive force. Real. guilt that is not ·acknowledged is., accord-
ing to 11owrer, the primary source of neurosis and psychosis. In order 
to 1 i.ve, Irtan needs to grow as much as he needs to breath. Unacknowledged ./ 
guilt rc.b s man of his life. 
1 




If it proves eir.pirically trJ.e that certain forms of conduct 
characteristically lead human beings into emotional instability', 
what better or firmer basis would one Hish for labeling such con-
duct as destructive, self•de£eating, evil, sintul? ••• there is, 
·surely, no disposition on the part of anyone to hold that sin 
as such, necessarily deans a person to inteminable suffering in 
the form of neurosis or psychosis. The presumption is rather 
that sin has this effect only where it is acutely tel t but not 
ackn&...rledged and corrected. 2 
Denial· is a cotn:::lon way of dealing with guilt. One attempts· to 
get rid of it by insisting that it doesn 1 t exist and by trying to atfirm 
freedan. However, amoral 'freedom' is valueless and 1 valueless 1 tends 
to be synoeymous with 'worthless. 1 The person who insists on his total 
1 freedom' whil.e refusing to ackn v.·rl edge guilt is saying that he is not 
1;orth struggling for - there is no ideal or vision of self against whiCh 
to measure action. 11 L'1 becoming a.>1oral, ethically neutral, a."l.d 1 free,' 
1-1e have cut the very roots of our being; lost our deepest sense of self-
hood and identit,r; and, with neurotics themselves, find ourselves asking: 
' 3 
I, .,. , 
The abil:ity to say 1 I'm sorey' is the abili t.r, to recoghize the 
truth about oneself. 
, I 
It is recognition of self as valuable and worth-
' 
1·ihila.· · Hoitever, ne one ever Sa.ys · '!'m· sor:ry-1 bt hi.n!Self,.' . The 'Words 
' . ' ~ ' ·•.: '. ' ~ 
that confirm one's o-;-m sense of self-worth must be spoken to another 
It, j_s only b8cause of this restored sense of worth - restored 
2 
MD!.,rrer, The Crisis in Psychiat:g al"ld Religion, pp. 42.,43., 
J 
.. ,. 
relation to another - that the person is able to accept himself. The 
process of reconciliation involv~,s reconciliation with one9elt as well 
as with others. 
It guilt is to be healed, the victim must be reconciled to him-
self. Were his feelings main~ outgoing, there would be little 
problem if he felt nothing but grief at the damage which he had. v"' 
caused to others, reconciliation with them would follow easi~. 
He would have no hesitation .in saying 1 I'm sorry.' But because 
his feelings are usually complicated by inner remorse and self-
rejeoticn, reccnciliaticn becoines difficult ••• 2 
Confession, repentance, apology are all attempts· to res~re a 
realistic vision of self. It is the acceptance or one's limita~ions 
and even the valuing or prizing of them. A persistent sense or guilt / 
refuses to look at the truth. The person acknowledges, the fact t.ruit 
a sin has been committed but does not, see the fact that he can be both 
a sinner and. saved. False guilt is a kind of moral ~qopia. . :Biebauakas 
says that the inability to accept one's whole beina, limitations as ; 
well as virtues, is characteristic of the neurotic.~-'· 
. There i.s a c;:loUbt in the mind of some• authors whether· a neurotic 
is real~ accepting guilt as a part of his personalit.y. Goppert 
(1960), dealing with a new approach to obsessive-cO!Ilpulsive 
neurosis,. expressed this idea in suggesting that the basic 
diffiqulty: in neurosis was failure to accept one's own limitations , ./ 
and thus to adjust within the framework of these limitations. ·3 
To say 'I'm sorry' is also to abandon atter.pts to manipulate 
2 
France, p. 20. 
J 
Vytautas J. Biebauskas, "Shifting of the Guilt Feeling in the 
Process of Psychotherapy," Pap•'!r given to t..'-le Internt?.tional Congress 
on Group Pszchotherapy, Hil::L'rl, Italy, July, 1963, p. 8. 
. .... 
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people. The person who has a sense of guilt may substitute manipulation 
for relationship. To some extent-:. the guilty person .has destroyed the 
truth that made relati.onship possible. For the guilt-ridden person, 
manipulation is not just a reaction in a particular time or place. It 
has become a way of life. 
Manipulation in such a.. general sense is or becanes not merely _the 
sum of whate!ve:r dis ere te games (in Berne's sense) a man has played 
in relation to particular people on particular occasions. It is 
instead a pervading style, a vi~ll-grounded, emPirical though otten 
unarticulated philosophy of human relations. SuCh a style fre-
quently coeXists with a profound distrust of oneself ah.d of 
others, and contr-i":::u. tes to a great dislike of oneself •. 4 
Finally, the statJ:nent 1 I'm sorry, •· as it attempts to restore 
truth, relationship, and a sen~e of self-acceptance, also signals abe-
lief in the pos3ibility of forgiveness and_change. No one says 'I'm 
sorry: unless there is :t10pe of forgiveness - if not. by the person in-
jured, then by ~omeone representing that person - a. friend, theragist, 
confessor. ~Vhen genuine guilt, which can be the refusal to grcm.t is 
acknowledged in repentance, it is tr~~sformed into possibility. 
"Ge.~:rine guilt reveals itself in a world of possibilities and the guilty 
persc::l avails himself of these possibilities in order to effect recti-




Sl:ostrom, 1'}1anipulation and Guilt, 11 Hu.·~1:anitas 5 (Fall, 1969): 
5 
Jager, p. 162. 
v 
What It Me11ns to Be Forgiven 
Forgiveness is a word or gesture that recognizes the truth and 
Horth of the other. In the recognition of that truth the possibility-
of dialogue is restored. Thus the expression of forgiveness is the 
experience of the restoration of relationship. The abili~J to grow · 
er:1erges in relationship and with it the possibility of love is renewed, 
both for the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven. Forgiveness 
ca.'"l transform the guilty and guiltless equally. "For the a:ct of loving 
another gives life to the lover as well as to the cne loved, and to 
6 
spea.'i{ t.he word of love is to be loved as well as to love. n And to 
speak the word of forgiveness is to be forgiven as well as to forgive. 
7 
"Ma'rl becomes man in personal encounter. 11 Man realizes his ~~ 
lizni tations in encounter and tries to raach past them in dialogue. 
ParadoxicaJJ.y, it is in the recognition of limitation {fi'm sor:cy"') and 
the restoration of dialogue (forgiveness) that the limitaticns are them-
selves overcome and ma..Yl becomes truly free. 
But what is here generally overlooked, it seems, is that re-
covery (constructive change, rede..-npt:.ion) is most assuredly 
attained, not qy helping a person reject and rise above his 
sins, but by helping him accept them. This is the paradox 
1-vhich we have not at all understood a...'"ld ivhich is the ver-.1 
cl1Ux o:f the prabiem: ••• the moment he ••• begins to accept his 
6 
Reule Howe, The Hiracla of Dialogue (Nel.v York: Seabury Press, 
1963), P• 6. 
7 




guilt and his sinfulness, the possibility of radical refo~ation 
opens up; and with this, the individual may legitimately, thoa.gh ·' · 
not without pain and effort, pass from deep, pervasive self-
. rejectial and Self-torture td a nGN' freedom, of self-respect and . 
peace. 8 · 
The restoration of truth not only involves the recognition of and 
responsibility for action, it also inv6lves the ability- to accept 
thoughts and emotions 3.S ~.:trt Of oneself~ ]it the case '0£ false guilt_, 
self-acceptance restores the person's ability to think and feel freely. 
. . ' . ' ·: ~~ ': 
It is no longer necessR~J to repress w~ard ~~oughts and emotions as 
evil and threatening. 
Like angry, frightened children, thoughts and feelings which a~e 
honestly accepted, can be loved, and in love their natural develop-
ment is reestablished. Eventually, irrespective of their original 
malfunction, they can become valued members of one's psychic 
family. 9 
Forgivene~s rest~res t}J.e per.son to a sense .. ?f peace and harmony. 
It is no longer necassa.r.r. to repress or act out guilt feelings if the 
. . ~ . ' 
actual source of guil~ has been confronted and forgiven. Repression 
tightens th~ v-reb of lies ;:~nd manipulation; forgiven~ss gently releases 
•• • ,> • .. ~ • ' • ' • • 
the g:1.!.l ty persun f:rom t.he \-leb and restores a sense of peace that is 
b(;t.:.'l. free and secure. 
Finally, forgi~eness does not simply restore one's abilit,y ·tore-
J.c1te to the person uho forgives. Forgiveness restores and strengthens 
a 
1-Iowrer, The Crisis in Pqchiatrz and R3ligton, p. 54. 
9 
Benson, p. 35. 
. .. 
one's ability to relate to ever.rone. Browning points· out that acceptance 
in the therapeutic model is representative acceptance.· If the thera-
pist's acceptance only involved the therapist himself, the clie.nt' s 
relationship with the therapist might improve, but his general con-
dition would remain the same. However, the aim of psychotherapy is 
to change the patient's life, not just a single relationship. 
In brief, the therapist's empathic acceptance announces, pro-
claims, and id tnesses to the fact that the client is truly 
aceeptable, not only to him as a therapist, but to some 
structure which transcends all finite referents, i.e., -to the 
universe and whatever power holds it together. And, simila;rly, _ 
the client does not come to feel that he is acceptable simply 
to the therapist,. b'.lt accepts the fact that he is acceptable 
in an ontological sense. 10 
The key to successful psychotherapy in Rogers 1 model is the 
recognition of the worth and dignity of the person. This is the pre-
supposition to all successful therapy. Similarly, forgiveness 
recognizes and restores a person to a position of worth. One must 
then take the next step and nsk not only wr~t it me&~s to be forgiven, 
but why is forgiveness possible. How is it possible to offer acceptance 
~~d forgiveness? Browning's answer is the recognition that our stan-
d.s.rds are limited and that ultimately a person's worth is based on or 
measured by a strtlcture that transcends finite standards. 
Rogers h3s contended that the ~~erapist must confront ~~e 
client as a person of worth and dignit,r •••• It is a presupposition 
10 
BrO',..ming, ·p. 150-51. 
1/ 
I. ' 
I, ' ' ' 
I> ' '· ~ 
' ,..., 
to all successful therapy •••• To say that each individual has an 
intrinsic worth and dignit,y is to s~y, in addition, that each 
individual has it irrespective of particular attitudes whiCh 
fellow h~'Wls ,may hold towa~ him. It. sugS,ests that ul. timately 
the individual's worth and dignity is measured by a structure 
which transcends all finite attitudes. 11 
LS 
It is at the point of the source of worth, the possibili~ of 
absolute acceptance, that psychology and theology begin to differ •. 
While psy~hology looks to man for possibilities of growth and accep.tance, 
',, 
theology finds the source of acc;~;Jts.nce. in Christ. 
11 
Thid., p. 1$1. 
I 
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Part II: SAClWiENTAL FORGIVENESS 
With the new rite of Penance (~Penitentiae., 1973), the 
emphasis in the celebration of the sacrament has moved from confession 
and atonement to acceptance, dialogue, and reconciliation. In the 
following pages we will examine these three ideas, acceptance, dialogue, 
and reconciliation, in light of the therapeutic model and explore the 
implications of these ideas for the new rite of Penance. 
CHAPTER IT. 
A THEOLOGY CF ACCEPTAUCE 
Acceotance and Guilt 
Ih discussing the therapeutic model, we said that the therapist 
receives or accepts the client as h,aving ~~sl!ntial worth and dignity and 
avoids imposing conditions of worth on the client. Browning describes 
the si tua'tion of acceptance as an ''active-passive relationship. 11 The 
therapist active~ cares for and values the feelings of the client, but 
expresses this concern by passively receiving and accepting the client's 
feelings. At times, the therapist will receive feelings the client can-
not confront or express. 
Of course, th.3 therapist's acceptance can never.be fully uncon-
ditional, but' Brmming, Howe, and ot:"lers ha~re used this model to explain 
God's ·unconditional f>..mpa.thie acceptance of man. God is the being who is 
totally· for others,. thas- his aceeptande of· the other· is. unqualified and. 
unconditior..al. 
In t."le ideal case, there would be nothing that others could do 
or say that would cause this individual to withdraw or put 
conditions on this capacity empathically to accept and receive 
the other. T'nis would be the nature of the ideal instance of 
u .. "\condi tonal e;,nathic acce-otnnce·. 1 
1 




The individual Browning is referring to here is God. Because 
this acceptance springs from the natura of his own heir~ for others, 
God must remain unconditionally accepting if he is to be consistent or 
congruent wi t.h himself. 
Browning compares Rogerian incongruence with sin as it is 
described by Irenaeus in his Christus Victor theory· of atonement. There 
i~ an element of idolatr,y in both sin and incongruence insofar as one 
is relying on finite values for one's sense of worth. Moreover, 
2 
" ••• absolutizing finite values leads to estrangement." The relation 
between guilt and isolation was discussed earlier as was the role guilt 
_plays 1.n separating one from the truth of self and others. Here the 
,_ 
sense of ~strru1gement includes not on~y self and others, but God. 
Brc~ing goes 011 to qompar.e incongruence with Irenaeus' idea of 
.... 
.... ne devil • The devil offers man false conditions of worth. However,. 
~~e devil does not exist independentl~ of God. He is a parasite livir~ 
off the life-giving energy of God. When the devil offers man-false con-
di tiona of worth,· he is simultaneously cutting off man from the source 
of his O<J'm life and ener6Y in God. Similarly, conditions of worth .in 
~he thetapeutic model live off man's own capacity to grow, the actual-
iz-ation tendency. l:f man is to regain his ability to grO'"..r_, he must be 
f::.•sed from those false conditions of i-rort:'l robbing him of his O'.m energy 
::md life. "The p0int is that Iranaeus' concept of the devil and the 
2 
Br-o•..r.:1il".g, p. 182. 
. ·). 
Pointing out that Irenaeus insists on maintaining man's freedom, 
~~ the possibilit,y of authentic guilt, Br~~ing believes that Rogers 
fails to maintain freedom. Rogers only identifies two sources of in-
congruence: in troj ect:.on and im.'ila turi ty. Thus he seems to ignore t.'lle 
possibili~ of choice. 
Brovming's criticism of Rogers is, in this instance, unfounded. 
The point of Rogers' therapy is to free people from false standards of 
4 
worth and restore their ability to experience and decide freely. This 
presupposes that a persoa has the capacity to decide. Rogers' theories 
also maintain that a ,erson can choose to be helped, and can choose to 
accept the therapist's acceptance. 
In terms of our consideration of guilt, the most important 
difference bet1-reen Rogers and Irenaeus lies in the source of growth: 
for Rogers, the source is the actualization tendenc.y; for Irenaeus it is 
the iJn.a.ge of God in man. The similarity between them is in their under-
etanding of the nature of guilt: 11 ••• here in both theories guilt 
em3rges as an inhibitor to change rather than an objective fact that 
3 
Ibid., P• 183. 
4 
Rogers and Stevens, p. 21. 
condemns the client even if he v.;ere to change •" Guilt ma;y be imposed 
on man as a result of his own deqision (true guilt) or by conditioning 
(false guilt); usually it is a·combination 6£both. In either case, 
acceptance remains the prerequisite for growth. The therapist was the 
source of acceptance in the therapeutic model. In a theology of 
acceptance the s_ource is God. 
Br~~1ing, P• 188. 
Acceptance and God 
One of' the presuppositions underlying the idea of' God's uncon-
ditional acceptance of the v:-orld is that God is in relation to the world .. 
Browning maintains that God accepts all feelings and yet remains un-
6 
changed and una.f.feoted by these feelings. GOd'' s self-:im.age is to 
accept empathically all feelings without· conditions or qualifications -
7 
to remain completely for others. 
The process of unconditional acceptance is an active/passive 
l . . 
process because~ as God accepts the feelings of the world, he also con-
. a 
veys his "care, concern, love and interest in the l-Iorld." God's 
\:-; 
empathic acceptance can be seen from the perspective of creation in that 
his accepta.-•1ce allows each new feeling in individuals to come into 
existence. 'l'he world is continually new because God lmows the world in 
·~ ' " . 
the Biblical, creative sense of the \vord 'knowledge.' His lmowledge is 
also acceptance. 
6 
Heschel proposes a similar idea in his description of God's 
p<?;;thqs, i. e•, God feels the slilffering of his people and yet remains 
f1.lllda1r.entally unchanged. Moltmann points out that this leads to a 
dualistic image of God in the sense that there is an exterl'lal God that 
feels and an internal God U.'laffected by feeling. According to Moltmann, 
only a Trini tarla."l understanding of God can resolve this dile.-·'lll'!la~ 
A1Jr:Jha:'1'l Hcschel, The Prophets (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), Jurgen 
Molt::1ann, The Crucified God {New York: Harper & Row, 1974). 
7 
Brovming, p. 193. 
8 
-n...1• d p·. 1. 9~ • 
.l.l.J • ' ., 
Although it may be subject to denial or distortion, man alwqs 
senses God's empathic acceptance, even if he is only a~are o£ it on a 
subconscious level. This knowledge of the existence of unconditiatal ·. 
acceptance is the chief motivating (actualizing) force ~n man and 
Browning identifies it as the image of God in man. On a conscious 
level, however, man tends to react to unconditional aceeptance with 
hostility and rejection because man is fighting to maintain bis. own · 
conditions of worth. God's acceptance must include an acceptance or 
these negative feelings, otherwise, God's acceptance WOUld be mere 
sentimentality. "Sentimentaiity is sympat.b.y- baseti on a shallow kriowledge 
9 
or feeling for the real feelings of the object of.sympathy." If we 
are to believe that we have indeed been .fu.l1y' accepted - believe to the 
point of being able to put aside conditions of worth - and be transformed 
into something new, we must be persuaded that these hostile feelings which 
we believe to be most unacceptable in us have been accepted. 
Browning says that the logical end of all these negative feelings 
is the death of the one accepting them: " ••• the cross represents God's 
capacit.y to feel fully the depths of sin•s hostilitY•••the rela~ivity 
of God's absoluteness." '!he resurrection, on the other hand, indica·tes 
th.at God can accept the depths of man's sinfulne.ss and still remain un-
qua1ified, totally accepting. In this sense, the cross and resurrection 
9 
Ibid.' p. 204. 
s:f 
' ,, 
manifest God's essence of "unqualified qualifiability" which, according 
' 10 
to Browning, is the very str..1ctureu of love. 
Browning maintains that this essence of empathic acceptance has 
alw~s existed, that it was first shown in God's " ••• creative caring 
and fellowship" and after the fall, through his "• •• graceful caring and 
.11 
fellOtis."lip." Moreover, God 1s acceptance has existed from all.times, 
but, because of Dian's self-imposed conditions. of worth, man has continu-
. . 
ally rejected it. God's acceptance remains, however, even in the face 
of man's rejection, and th:.s um;avering acceptance. is .forgiveness. 
11Forgiveness is tha co:1t:.::'.~1ation of God's ur~conditional empathic 
acceptance in spite of man's rejection of it. Forgiveness is the nature 
12 
of grace. 11 
There ara tHo major proble:':ls with Browning's theory.-
.. , '• ; -~, .:t! t. 
is that it would seem that grace is a necessar,y part of creation, be~ 
cause of God's nature - a being totally for others - and his emPathic 
acceptGnce of man. That statez::ent would seem to contradict the more 
traditional description of grace as wholly gratuitous. Hwever, this 
particular problem of the gratuity of grace vs. man's tendency toward 
t.he ::rJ.pernatural (the image of God in man) is beyond the boundaries of 
10 
Ibid., p. 205. 
1 'i 
Toid., P• 206. 
12 
Ibid., p. 207. 
this study'. The second and more immediate qu·estion involves Browning's 
understanding of the person and work of Jesus Christ. This point is 
cruCial for an understanding of the sacramental character of Christ's 
activities and of the sacraments themselves. 
Christ, for Browning, is the manifestation of forgiveness 1;hat 
13 
alrea~ exists, but not the cause of forgiveness. He maintain~ that 
the event of Jesus Christ does not "reconstitute our relationship with 
· · ' . 1L 
God, rr but rather shows us that relationship in terms we can und~stand~ 
' 
This view understands C:"lrist ·only in terms of manifes_tation and .ove.rlooks 
the role of Christ as mediator. Browning has concentrated on Christ•s 
function and ignored the person. In the next chapter we will explore 
C:'lrist' s role as mediator. }.·' :r-•: 
The importance of acceptance in the therapeutic model has been 
. . •'- .... '~"{ ~ 
discussed and we have seen that the source of this acceptance is in Qod • 
. ~· .. , ,~. ~ " 
But there were two parts to Rogers' description of the nature ofman: 
actualization and socialization. .t.ssu.'Tling that accept~ce is.~ pre-
requisite of actualization, how is it can.-rmmicated - why cant t J?e 
communicated? In the therapeutic model, the client experiences th~ 
acceptance of the therapist in dialogue. As we will see in the next 
chapter, Christ hL~self is the dialogue of sacr~ents. 
13 
r.>id., PP• 210 and 240. 
14· 
Ibid., P• 241 • 
CHAPTER V 
A THEOLCGY OF DIALCGUE 
Dialogue and God 
The old rite of Confession with its emphasis on anonymity and 
the use of fixed formulas maintained a reciprocal relationship with a 
sacramental theology that often tended to be highly meChanistic. AS 
Schillebeeckx points out, "• •• the inclination lvas to look upon the sacra-
ments as but one more application, although in a special manner, of the 
1 
general laws of cause and e.f::tect. rr 
/ 
Encount(.),r p.as, no doubt, beco:ae sar.ething of ,a cliclle in modern 
philcsophica.l and psychological writing, but Schillel>_e~ckx argues that 
enco~'"lt~r 11ith God ha~ aluays been recog1;1ized ip.,,theolorg as a .reality. 
This encounter is experienced in and through dialogue. l1a.n constantly 
se;;ks to encotmter God, to experience his ,.;_cceptance, but cannot do so 
by his mm power. BrO"..ming maintained that God 1 s acceptance is al-v;ays 
experienced, at least OI1 a sul;>e.or.scious level, because of the nature 
of God; however, if the therapeutic model holds true, acceptance can 
only be experienced in encounter. . Schilleb.eeckx: says it is the desi.re 
for encounter that is experienced by ~1 men - but this encounter is 
o:-:.J~,.- r!ill.de possible through Christ. The first sentence of the Decree 
1 
E. Schil::ebeeckx, O.P., Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter 




emphasizes Christ's role as mediator. "Reconciliation between God and 
men was brought about by our Lord Jesus Christ in the nvster-J of his 
2 ':. 
death and resurrection." 
Schillebeeckx follows Augustine's history of man's search for 
encounter with God, tracing it through pagan religions and Israel to 
3 
the emergence of the Christ. 11 All humanity receives that inward word 
4 
of God calling men to a communion in grace with himself." This call 
is the image or God in man and is the source of man's need to grow, to 
'actualize' himself. The world itself, as a creation of God (and, per-
haps as important, our n~ed to experience the world) is a 'stimulus' 
that lures us to further growth and greater openness to experience. 
"Life itself becomes a truly supernatural and external revelation, in 
5 
which creation begins to speak the language of salvation." To the 
ex~ent one refuses to grow and persists in a sense of guilt, one is also 
rejecting life itself. 
2 
Decree of ~~e Rite of Penance, Sacred Congregation for Divine 
Worship, (reprinted by Sacred Heart Monastery, Hales Corner, Wise., 1974) 
?• 3. 
3 
.Henri de tubac, S ,J. traces the same history in The lSJ steey: of 
the Supe:-natu:ral (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), hovrever he concen-
tretes en the para.dox of man's desire for the encounter with the super-
na.tural and his inab:tli ty to attain it by his OT.rm pO'tver. Schillebeeckx 
empha3izes the encounter itself. 
4 
Sehillebeeckx, p. 7. 
5 
Ibid.' p. 8. 
The pagan 1 Church, 1 according to Schillebeeckx, experienced 
moments ot grace, touched upon the~reality ot unconditional acceptance. 
These moments (and here Schillebeeckx differs from·Browning) were 
mediated through Christ, made possible by Christ. 
Grace (andi' using Browning's definition, forgiveness) becomes 
visible in Israel. Dv Schillebeeckx' interpretation ot Ezekiel, one 
can see that Isl"ael is defined by and given worth through its acceptance 
by Yahweh. "•• .thou w.sst ca..st out upon the face ot the earth in the 
abjection of thy soul ci. e.' because you were found worthle~SJ ••• passing 
by/ I [Yahweh] saw that thou wast trodden under toot in thy O'.m blood. 
.And I said to thee 't-ihen thy H·ast in thy blood: Live ••• arid ~row up ••• 11 
6 
(Ezekiel i6:5-7). This encounter, again, was mediated through Christ. 
Israel is, first of all, accepted; is told it is accepted (in dialogue 
made possible throU6h Christ) and can, therefore, grow "like a plant in 
the field." 
God's acceptance re:nains even when Israel chooses to reject it 
nnd to establis..~ its o~m standards of worth. ''You also took your fair 
jB,·rels of rrry gold and silver, which I had given you, and made for your-
s.:lf izn.ages otmen ••• 11 (Ezekiel i6:17). Nevertheless, God again offers 
Israel life and the possibility of growth (Ezekie! 18:30-32). 
6 
Ibid., p. 12. 
.$8 
God continual~ offered his acceptance to Israel in dialogue, but 
Israel often would not or could not respond, would refuse to live and 
grOiv~ would sink into the stagnant silence of a dying relationship •. What 
1"as needed, says Schillebeeckx, was one who could respond in dialogue 
perfectly. In him the response would be so complete that the barrier 
between the word spoken and the response v-rou.ld be shattered. He would 
be the word itself, the dialogue itself: " ••• The perfection both of the 
divine invitation and of the human response in faith.,. •• This was Jesus. 11 
7 
Each act of Jesus, human and divine, _is .both an act of uncondition-
al acceptance and a perfect response to that acceptance. Jesus, who was 
always t..'le mediator of grace, makes grace possible. Moreover, this 
.s.cce~tance is manifested in a visible fom., "a bestowal ofsalvation 
8 
in historical visi1')i11.ty; It thus, it 'is sa~.r~:nenta:l'. 
In the therapeutic model, the invisible, inteMor- realit.ies or 
~otlon .and ncceptance are c.om."mlllicated throucfi dialogue within a visible 
encounter between two people. In a way, the expressions of acceptance 
th.s.t are sensib~ preceived become a sign of an interior reality. It is 
bec.;:.use the client perceives the underlying reality that he is able .to 
change. The encounter itself is not a sacra~ent (although it has been 
speculated that sa.cramental·grace may be present in a counseling situation). 
llc:.~eYer, it pro•Tides us ~"Hh 11 good analozy of sacrament. 
7 
Thid. J P• 13. 
8 
Thid.' p. 15. 
. . 
59 
Jesus is a visible realization of the grace of red~'llption, of 
unconditional ·acceptance. He is not simply the manifestation of 
acceptance which exists somewhere else, in someone else; he is acceptance 
itself. He is, therefore, a. sign that causes Hhat it signifies, a 
sacrament.. 
9 




Chrfst is the center point of God's love for man and man's re-
sponse to God.· 'lhere is a dmmward movement, God's love coirdng to us 
10 
11by way of a humari he.ir+, fi ; cmd an upward movement, Son to the Father, 
man to God. Christ is d5.alogne, but, as with ever.J dialogue, there are 
innumerable levels of meanings, a rainbow of nuances. He worShips the 
Father as his Sor. and as a man representing all men. He accepts the 
Father's love while besto1tdng it on men. He is "personally a dialogue 
with God the Father, the supreme realization and therefore the nor.m and 
11 
the source of every encounter with God." 
Schilleb~ckx also says that Christ's life is characterized b.1 
gr~ ... rth. He is not fully realized (actualized) at his birth, when he 
calls his first disciples, performs his first miracle, or is honored b.1 
9 
Thid., P• 15. 
10 
Ibid., p. 17. 
'11 
Ibid.' p. 18. 
. ') 
the crowds on Palm Sunday. He is not willing to trade ·the possibility 
of what he will become for securi~ or power (~ 4:1-1J). He is 
established absolutely as the Christ at the Resurrection - life has 
grown to new life~ love toward love. 
Finally, as Schillebeeckx points out, Christ doesn't sit there· 
at the right hand of the Father doing nothing. The dialogue contimes. 
The Son continuously worships th,e Father, Je~us sends forth his love 
in the form of the Spirit. Sacramental encounter, man's dialogue with . 
12 ' 
God, continues in the Church. 
12 
Ibid., p. 41. 
--
.... 
Dialogue and Confession 
Every sacrament is a prayer; a dialogue between man and GOd, and 
between men in a community made possible by God. There is really only 
one sacrament, the Chur~~, and each of the traditional seven sacraments 
are expressions of the one. :Bec:nse of the presence of many peQt)le, 
dialogue in the other sacraments tend to become formalized and ritual-
ized. . Confession is unique bscause it is a one-to-one encounter, a 
!:leeting of two people on 'm intimate level. Thus, Confession is the 
13 
ndialogue sacrament ;e3:::- exeellence." Through this encounter with 
another person, it offers the penitent an opportunity for encounter with 
God in prayer. The old rite of Penance tended to be ritualized, im-
14 
personal and mechanistic. From t~e first words or the new rite the 
sacrament is pla.ced on a personal level and dialogue is·pos'sible. 
Like the dialogue that is .christ himself, the dialogue of Con-
fession exists en m3ll,V le"rel:'l. The new rite quotes Philippians 1 :9-10 
on the possibility of ever-deepening understanding: "M;r prayer is that 
ycur lcve for ea.ch ether Ina7 increase more and more and never stop im-
pro~ring your knowledge and deepening your perception. 11 As Buckley points 
13 
Fran·::i:~ J. Buckley, ".i.1ecer:t Development in the Sacrament of 




"The priest should welcome the penitent with fraternal charity, 




out, the dialogue can start at one point, and within a free-flowing 
conversation "peel off layer after layer of obstacles and defenses un-
~ 1S 
til the core of personality stands open before the gaze of God and man.n 
lfuen the penitent approaches the sacrament of ~nfession, he does 
so because he has alreaqy experienced somethL~g of God's acceptance. No 
one says he is sorry unless there is hope of forgiveness. Christianity 
16 
itself is "the realization that it is safe to love." The penitent's 
act of coming to confess is an act of faith in God's-acceptance and the 
worth that acceptance creates. It is a sign of the penitent's ~rust 
17 
nt._'l-}at all is not lost, that growth is still possible." 
God initiates this dialogue with the grace that first enabled the 
penitent to recognize his sin; the penitent's decision to confess is a 
response to t..'lat initiative. Thus, the priest's "lvelcome, "with fratemal 
chari."t'J ... w~th friendly words," represents still;. :another l$vel ot dialogue 
wi t.'lin the process of Penance. The priest' :3 words of lvelcome could, per-
:wps, also be tal.cen as represantati,:e of t..~e conmunity's interes~ in the 
penitent. Earlier we exa.--rtined thf'i rela.tionship between guilt a.11d isolation; 
to refuse to grow is to cut oneself off .from the community that m~es growth 
!'ossibJ.e. The welcome shatters the isolation that guilt has imposed and 
16 
Angelo Neophitos, G.!-1., "Is Confession a Gatne with God? 11 






offers the penitent the possibility of reconciliation with the communi~. 
18 
· The reading of the Word of God opens b.oth the prle st and the 
pe~itent to still deeper levels of dialogue. God's merc,y and love are 
again proclaimed, reinforcing the moments of grace that first touched 
the penitent's heart. He is again reassured that forgiveness and gro~vth 
are still possible. 
The Introduction to the Rite states that contrition is the most 
ir11portant act of the penitant. but this 11heartful sorrow" is the nega-
tive half,; the sac":.ion stresses that thare should be "a profound change 
19 . 
of the lThole person. 11 If guilt is a refusal to grow, then the recog-
~ ' -, ' ~ . 
nit ion and rejection of guilt necessarily brings grow~ and change. 
In confession the penitent must " ••• open his heart to the minister 
20 
of God.'' Here the process of dialogue is brought ·to its deep'est level. 
'The penitent iS> brought to the reality of who' he is. nlusions and 
rations.lizations are swept a.side as the penitent hears his own voice 
describing these t.'"lings his heart h~d been afraid to acknowledge. The 
9eni tent may, pemaps, watch the reaction of the priest to see forgive:" 
ness as well as hear the words of absolution.' 
aite of Penance, p. 16. 
19 
!oid., p. ! o. 
20 ,\ 
Tu!.d., p. 11. 
Ear~ in the histor,r of the sacrament, the act of penance itself 
was the central part of the sacram~nt and involved everything from 
weeping and wailing at the door of the Church to embarking on long and 
arduous pilgrimages. Gradual~, as contrition and confession came to be 
21 
emphasized, the penance became routine and perfunctory. The new 
rite suggests tn•t.tbe act or penance be :relevant to the situation of 
22 
the penitent, "a remedy for sin and a help to renewal of life." As 
23 
in contrition, the point is to grow into new life. 
If dialogUe reachad its deepest level during the penitent's con-
fession,, it is most profound at the moment of absolution, for it is here 
that the dialogue becomes that of God to man. Christ is dialogue and this 
beco:r.1es evident as the priest pronounces the words of absolution. "!n 
the sacrament of Penance, as in the Incarnation.; Ule human voice beccmes 
24 
God's voice. 11 As acceptance becomes visible in the Incarnation of 
Christ, so too, forgiveness becomes visible (sensible) durin.g abs.olut~on. 
21 
The name of the sacrament has also shifted along with the e.'r!lphasis 
of the sacrament, moving from 'Penance' to 'Confession' to the somewhat 
a-,rk-ward 'Sacrament of Reconciliation.' rlhile 'Penance' remains the -official 
ter.m, the more informal 'Confession' has been used throughout this study 
because it emphasizes the experience of dialogue. 
22 
Rite of Penance, p. 11. 
23 
Buckley 3uggests that elaborate penance are untlecessary, 11to 
ltP/e and keep on loving in a sinful -v:orld is hard enough for those ;Jho 
really \Iork at it." ConuntUlio, p. 91. 
24 
Buckley, "I Confess, n p. 12. 
•• 
65 
The old rite tended to emphasize the penitent's role and the 
honesty and accurac.y of his confesjion. Monden points out that what 
25 
the penitent tells the priest is only a sign of 1-rhat he is telling God. 
Unlike the si tua.tion of the therapeutic model, the dialogue of confession 
\.rill not falter if the penitent's confession is ina~·curate (asswn~ 
. . . - r ~~ . 
the inaccuracy is not willful) or aukward, or if the priest misunde·r-
stands the penitent's words. ·Confession is not a court of lw, but"~ 
. .. 
sacrament; the em,Phasis should not be on the testiinnity of the accused:, 
26 
but on the encou."lter with God. 
' . \. : > 
In fact, concentrating·on.a recita.-
tion of one's sins cnn become a ~e~ls of avoiding a confrontation with 
tite reality of God's love. It can be a means of persisting in a .s~n~ 
27 
of guilt and refusing to gro-11. 
The er.1ph2.sis in the new rite brings the penitent out of a self- · . 
centered concentration on his. Oim sinfulness to an experience of Christ''s 
. . . 
J.ovr:.!. Reconciled through the dialogue that is Christ, ~e penitent can 
"li·..re anc gro'tr like a plant in the field." 
25 
Louis Hon:len, l'he Vvstery of Sin and Fo1"giveness, p. 169 •. 
Bernard Ha.ering makes the sa::1e point in Shalom: Peace, The 
>3acra~·:ant of Reconciliation (Ne~v York: Inw.ge, 1967), p. 11. 
27 
Ht:ophitos, p. 24. 
CHAPTER VI 
• 
A 'IHEOLOGY OF RECONC:U.IATICN 
Christ, who manifests and makes possible God's unconditialal 
acceptance of man, is the center point of dialogue between man and God. 
He is a radical Yes to life and growth, to the full meaning or being 
human. "1he Son of God, the Christ Jesus that. we proclaimed among 70U -
••• was never Yes and No: with him it was always Yes, and however maJV' 
. . 
promises God made, the Yes to them is all in him." (2 Cor. 1 :19-21). 
. .,, .. ~ ..
f 
Persistent guilt is a 'no' to one's own htuii.anity. ·• Rogers said 
that man is characterized by the need to grow and that the source of .the 
need to ~row is the actualization tendency. Growth is JiJ.ade possible by 
acceptanca.- Bro-w":ling suggested that the source of 't.h:e need·to· grow is 
the image of God in man and that growth is made possible through God's 
~"l~ondit.ional acceptance, the grolL'1d of all human acceptance.· To refuse 
to grow, therefore, is to deny the truth of iihat one is and the reality 
of God's acceptance. 
Mowrer believes that the problem of guilt is not so much the 
morality of a specific act as it is the anoeymi ty of the act and the con-
sequent need for deceit. Acceptance experienced withlll a social context 
:.s e. prerequisite for growth, however, the result or a deliberate refusal 
to grc11v. is to disassociate oneself from t..he people who communicate that 
1 
acceptance - the Church. Refusing all opportunities of reconciliation, 
1 
Haering, p. 28. 66 
67 
the person can beco~~ surrounded by an isolation that grows deeper and 
more L'npenetrable until it has reached a state that is hell itself. 
"Hell is our i,solated selves having finally obtained th~ wish expressed 
by our lives; self-entombed eternally frozen in the attitude of refusal 
: '2 ' 
that leaves atd~ath the resume of our entire life." Therefore, al-
though one cannot eSCC\pe into nothingness through the "metapeysical 
suicide" ot g~ilt, one does slip into a self-imposed isolation, 'Which is 
itself a kind of nQt~in~ess. 
The isolation of guilt'is ac~Ompanie& by a'sense 6f worthless· 
ness. In refusing to gro:: ons has said 'not to 'GOdts,·ace~ptanee as w""ell 
as to that of th~ , canf;,ini ty. Recondfliation bre~~ the1barriers of 
isolation and the sense of wor-thlessness. It restores one, to relation-
ship 1-Ti th cozr.mu.ni ty so that one is able to listen 9penJ,y ~ th the en-
tanglements of lies an~ deceit. ln~en the penitent is able to l~sten, he 
' ' .3 
can hear the words of God's acceptance and learn again of God's love. 
' ' ' ' ~ 
Forgiveness restores the penitent's ss::1se of worth. "'lhe ••• goal of the 
use of the new Rite is to encourage the penitent to have done with doubts 
about his worth, about the interest and goodness of God, a.YJ.d to hL."''lSelf 
t2.ke the initiatives 1mich will heal hi1n of the wounds of the secular 
..... 
c. 
Robert 0 1 CO!l:':'lell, s .J.' HT'ne Se::!.se of Sin in t..he Hodem 1Torld_. 11 
Fl l'iJ] rrstery of Sin a."ld Foz-gi-.reness, p. 19. 
3 




and the material." God's initiative of grace restores the penitent's 
own sense of initiative; he can once more grow through his own qecisions. 
Reconciliation cannot exist merely as an abstract theory, it must 
exist concretely as forgiveness between men. The new rite~ with its 
rejection of an~ty, and its emphasis on encounter, brings the recon-
ciliation o:f the Paschal 11\YStery to a concrete exP,ression o:f forgiveness. 
One is brought, :for a· moment, from the' majesty of Christ's Easter appear-
ance to the disciples (Jn. 20:19-23) to the intimac.y of his encounter 
• - ' '· -, .\"J·t -
with Peter {Jn. 21: 15-17). The celebration of Penance: :ts the ·celebra-
. .- .. 
tion of the Easter myster.y on a personal~ individual level. It restores 
the penitent to the process of growth and to life itself • 
. ,Cl,lrist' s incarnation was a process formed in love and gomg 
through death to ne1v life. This process of his life, death, and resur-
rection bestows on man his ability to grm.v. Each man, formed in Christ's 
love, rejects his own life when he refuses to grow. The new rite of 
Penance, recognizing the fundamental unity of man's peycholog1c~. and 
.:;;piri tual life, .. offers man the 'yes 1 to new life and growth that is 
Christ himse1f. 
4 
Ja'rf!es F. C..'li!lpbell, "Hew Rites of Penance-new Opportunities," 
rastoral Life 24 (1975) 8:34. 
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